members of the Commission with us participating and offering their words as well.

I want to just focus on a few things because I know that you have experts here. You have excellent panelists to -- to make presentations. I'd like to just, for the record, mention a few of the points that many of my colleagues and I have been working on in Washington, D.C. First and foremost of course, the -- the public owns the airwaves. We all know that. And it was Congress that created the FCC to give it the opportunities to help manage those airwaves for the public's benefit. that my colleagues and I will be prepared to act as well, based on what the FCC does or doesn't do, in trying to protect the public's interest with regard to those airwaves and perhaps we'll have to undertake a review of the FCC if we don't find that the FCC is willing to undertake a thorough and comprehensive review of these media ownership rules on its own and give the public an opportunity to provide input as well.

This seems like a runaway train. We have right now a little bit more than a month to review these rules, yet we're reviewing them in isolation because we're not being provided by the Communications Commission the opportunity to know what they think. What the Commission thinks before it decides to issue its final rules, which seems to be working backwards. And for many of us it's of great concern. Many of us in Congress, Senate and House have expressed in writing our desire to have

proposed rules issued prior to any final rules being enacted by the FCC, and we'd like to have an opportunity for full public comment, not just for members of Congress but for the public in general on those proposed rules before they become final.

But it seems as well that we have a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil attitude by those who could communicate the information to us, and there, by that I mean, as I think both chairmen just mentioned, are our media outlets. Our -- our major media outlets, I believe, have done a dramatically poor job of getting the information out there. And unfortunately, you talk about hear-no-evil and see-no-evil, that can't be an excuse because they're the ones that produce what we hear and what we see.

So I hope that this will be a clarion call for the media, all the media, to come forward and help the public have a better understanding of what is occurring over the next several weeks. And I hope longer than just the five or so six weeks that we have left before comment is to close and rules will be issued.

I want to mention a couple of other things. Diversity.

It seems to me as we talk about diversity ownership within the media universe, we forget perhaps the most common meaning of the word diversity in America these days. And to me diversity within the media would also include our ethnic and racial diversity so that -- and of course gender diversity -- so that

we don't just talk about big versus small, rural versus urban, but we also talk about the fact that in too much of America most of America is excluded and certainly minority and women are also very much excluded within the means of ownership of our media outlets. And I hope, as Chairman Copps had mentioned and I believe that Chairman Adelstein would also have discussed, that there is a need to incorporate the needs of our minority communities of women when we talk about ownership opportunities within the media.

And having said that I would also hope that we would all urge upon the FCC transparency, as much as possible that what goes on within the FCC occur within the light of day. And if it weren't for Chairman -- I wish you were chairman -- Commissioner Copps and now Commissioner Adelstein trying to go out there and inform the public, I suspect most people in America would have little understanding of what may be about to occur in America. So I applaud the efforts of our two commissioners participating today, but I hope that the FCC, the Commission as a whole, recognizes that this must be done in a transparent fashion so that we can all say, when the results are finally in, that we all understood and had an opportunity to comment.

And finally, let me focus on a few issues that are of great concern to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, to Latinos throughout this country, and certainly to minorities generally

throughout this country, and I would include women as well.

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Ownership. I mentioned it earlier. We've got to do something about this consolidation that's occurring because it's -- it's not just a matter of getting big, it's -- it's a matter of a few, for the most part, white males, getting very big, and we've got to stop that from happening because if we want to have a diversity of view reflected in what goes out, whether it's broadcast, radio, print, you need to have that diversity of perspective that comes only from your background, from the opportunities to have been one who grew up from those origins. I would hope that the FCC, and I know Commissioner Copps has been one who has always promoted this, but I hope that the entire membership of the FCC will recognize this as well.

Secondly, expertise. We're about to have final rules issued soon by an organization which, for the most part, I don't believe reflects the needs, desires, the background, the history of women and minorities. And I would pose a question that perhaps Chairman -- Commissioner Copps and also Commissioner Adelstein -- I keep -- I'm -- I'm -- I'm hoping more than anything else, I guess, that Commissioner, you'll become a chairman. Maybe after 2004 that'll happen. But getting -- moving on to other things.

I hope that what we can do is find that there will be ways for us to address not just the ownership issue but also what

the FCC brings to the table in terms of expertise and resources to address the issues that are important to minorities, African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Latinos and women. Who do you have on your staff to guide you on some of these very important principles and will you have people of color and women who can guide you in making those decisions? I would pose that question to the chairman, Mr. Powell, to see where that takes us.

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And finally, finally, when it comes to the issues -- when it comes to the issues of how minorities are treated, I hope that we'll recognize as well that we have to tackle some very important issues that in some cases the media outlets have very little control over. Nielsen and Arbitron do a tremendous job of trying to gauge ratings, but in some cases I think they do a very flawed job in that regard. And too often they don't take into account how many people of color, how many women are truly watching what they really want, and I believe it will be time soon that we examine whether the monopolies that we allow Arbitron and Nielsen to maintain within the rating system will be a subject of review by the FCC, or certainly I hope by Congress because it seems to me that if we want to give the media the best opportunity to do a good -- not only a good job but a tremendous job of doing well with the airwaves that the public has given to them, then we have to make sure that they have the best information on which to make their decision and

that's where Nielsen and Arbitron truly require some oversight.

I would only make the final point that I believe with -as Chairman Copps -- Mr. Copps -- Commissioner Copps -- it's -it's ingrained, sorry -- that Commissioner Copps made, that
perhaps what we should do is truly look at the licensing issue.
That might give us a better sense of what people are doing so
that instead of after the fact, after a media organization has
not done a good job, but before we give them a license that we
determine what they will do and find out if they follow
through. I think that's a wise course of action.

I appreciate, Sandra, what you have done here. I'm pleased to see so many people here. I hope we have some media representation that will report on what goes on here today, and I hope and pray that this will not be the last, certainly not within the five-week period, that we hear from the chairman and the commissioners on this very important issue. Thank you so very much.

MS. ORTIZ: I'd also like to recognize that Congresswoman Diane Watson, who could not be here today because she's flying back to Washington -- the congressional recess is ending -- I think Congressman Becerra is running off to catch a flight also -- but she -- Congresswoman Diane Watson, who is chair of the Congressional Entertainment Caucus did send a representative, her press secretary, Lois Hill-Hale, who is with us today and will be reporting back to the congresswoman

about today's events.

I'm also pleased to report that we have Commissioner

Adelstein back on line, and we'd like to hear the end -- the

end of that -- that setup that you had intrigued us with when

we got cut off so suddenly. So -- excuse me -- Commissioner

Adelstein.

COMMISSIONER ADELSTEIN: Well, thank you so much for bringing me back. Am I back up? It's working?

MS. ORTIZ: Back up.

COMMISSIONER ADELSTEIN: All right. Well, if -- if an FCC Commissioner can't telecommute, who can?

I was speaking about your very own William Randolph

Hearst, somebody of great interest to the people in L.A. and

somebody you know a lot about. And I'm not sure when it cut

off, but I was trying to say that he was trying to decide, you

know, people -- he was in the -- he was in the movie business

and he was in the newspaper business, and when he was asked why

he was concentrating on newspapers with a limited regional

appeal rather than spending his energy on motion pictures with

a worldwide audience, he pithily replied, "I thought of it.

But I decided against it. Because you can crush a man with

journalism and you can't with motion pictures." Well, we may

well be on the verge of creating a new Citizen Kane for the

21st century or maybe a handful of them.

The FCC should proceed with a lot more caution because

caution and speed don't mix well, particularly not when our safeguards of democracy are at stake. Diverse views fuel our public debate and they strengthen our democracy. We need more voices in the nation's media but not just from one ventriloquist. Each of you should be a part of this dialogue. That's why I'm so glad we're doing what we're doing here today. I can't emphasize enough the importance of your participation. If we're to craft media ownership rules that best serve the public interest, we've got to hear from the public. That's why Commissioner Copps and I are traveling around the country to hear your voices. And I'm so pleased that Commissioner Copps has shown such great leadership. He was there before I got there and he did a great job of setting this -- setting this up.

So good luck and know that you're engaged in what is the most critical dialogue taking place in America today. And thank you for letting me be a part of it, and thank you for letting me come back in after a little audio disruption there. I really appreciate it. This is a great honor to be with you today. Back to Sandra.

MS. ORTIZ: Thank you, Commissioner Adelstein. I'd now like to introduce Matt Spitzer, who is dean of the USC Law School. Dean Spitzer founded the Center for Communication Law and Policy and has written extensively on telecommunications issues. Dean Spitzer.

DEAN SPITZER: Pardon me. I think it works better this way. You get fewer of the exploding P's in this configuration. I want to say welcome to everyone. USC Law and -- Law School and Annenberg School jointly sponsor the Center for Communication Law and Policy. Sandra Ortiz is our executive director and has put together this -- I should say this conference twice and for that I want to thank her. I want to thank Commissioner Copps and Adelstein and all the other participants here today. I look forward to a great success.

I want to say two things. Then I'll sit down. I'll try to be brief. First, I want to talk sort of about the tone of the proceedings and second I want to introduce Christopher Yoo.

First, about the tone. This is not a corporate boardroom.

It's not a guild hall. It's an academic setting. And as such,

I'll give you the two-minute version of my introductory lecture

to my administrative law course about the difference between

private interest and public justifications.

Private interests are perfectly fine for motivating you to action. But they're not always the things you can talk about effectively in public as good reasons for doing something.

For example, I'm a teacher. I'm an educator here at USC.

It is entirely possible that the advent of online educational schools will cost me my job. There are now online law schools which are growing very rapidly. Most people who know about the law school world expect about -- okay -- expect about -- about

a third of us to fail within the next 20 years. That is, we become history. My salary, if I'm still working 20 years, will almost certainly be lower than it is today because of competition from online schools. None of this is a justification for invoking governmental regulation to suppress online education, in spite of the fact that I and others like me will be hurt and that old institutions that have been around for many years will be swept away. Instead, you need to make arguments about students being better or worse served, being better or worse educated and so forth in order to make public interest --

(End of Side A of Tape 1, Beginning of Side B.)

DEAN SPITZER: My industry segment will disappear or even

I will have less creative control over my work. Why? Because

public interest arguments are those that are designed to

produce -- pardon me -- public interest arguments are sort are

sort of the following nature. The set of rules that govern

industry structure will produce an output that either produces

less interesting, less creative fare that is not as interesting

to viewers and listeners. That's a public interest argument.

Perhaps the industry structure produces less news in public affairs that allow citizens to make informed decisions. Perhaps it produces higher ad rates, which ripple through the cost of purchased goods and thereby transfer large amounts of money from the public to sellers of ad time. All right. These

would be public interest arguments. However, saying it so doesn't make it so.

At an academic setting empirical testing is, in my opinion, and by the way in the opinion of the D.C. circuit, absolutely necessary. Once you've said the argument, you still have to back it up.

Okay. I'll move on. I think the microphone is telling me
I've said enough in this regard and so I will. Instead I'll
move on to introducing our speaker. Christopher Yoo is going
to give us a legal overview of ownership regulations.
Christopher is a professor at Vanderbilt. He's prolific. He
writes on law and economics of telecommunication, including
broadcasting and cable TV. I particularly recommend an
extremely extensive survey and synthesis of the law about
vertical integration as applied to broadcasting and cable.
It's in the Yale Journal on Regulation. And if you don't do it
at least give it to someone in your General Counsel's office to
read because someone should know this stuff.

At any rate, the definition in academia of a sophisticated scholar is "someone who thinks a lot like I do." And -- but only -- and only sometimes do we have the qualifier "but does it a little better." And so it's -- it's my pleasure to introduce a sophisticated young scholar, Christopher Yoo.

MR. YOO: Well, part of the sophistication is the high tech toys I get to play with. So if you'll bear with me while

the screen comes down.

It's an occupational hazard as a teacher. I'm really troubled without a blackboard, so I'm afraid this is the best I'm going to be able to do here.

My job here is to provide a legal overview of the media regulations that are comprising the biennial review that will culminate apparently on June 2nd by the -- with the announced attention -- intention of the Federal Communications Commission to revisit a large number of media ownership rules. These media ownership rules have been in play since at least the 1970's unchanged and have their seeds, many of them -- or their origins, back in the 1930's. And I believe that we are at an unprecedented crossroads in U.S. media policy for several reasons.

First is, there are an emergence of tremendous new communications technologies that have opened up the policy space since these rules were last revisited in the 1970's. There's a tremendous expansion in the number of broadcast outlets, television stations. As recently as 1980, the average household received fewer than four. The average U.S. household now receives in excess of 13 over-the-air broadcast signals. Cable, direct broadcast satellite systems have transformed the television environment, Internet, through generation wireless in the offing, all of which have dramatically changed the policy environment in which we operate.

Second is significant changes to the legal environment. The first of which is the biennial review process initiated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. For the first time the federal statute requires the Federal Communications Commission to revisit all of its ownership regulations every two years with the presumption that absent adequate justification that they will be repealed. The other thing that's happened that's dramatically changed the environment is a number of recent judicial decisions that have struck down a number of these longstanding ownership policies. Two were decided in 2002, one was decided in 2001, and they have raised serious questions about whether the continuing vitality of a lot of these rules and whether they'll continue to exist.

And lastly, I think there's a great deal of new thinking about regulation. I think the seminal moment occurred when President Clinton, a democrat, said, "The era of big government is over." That opened up a brand new dialogue wherein people of all parts of the political spectrum are willing to think about new solutions to old problems and rethink the way we approach classic regulatory issues.

The net result is many of the rules that we are going to talk about today are up for grabs for the first time in 60 years since they were originally promulgated, and it's created a tremendous amount of interest in what the future of the industry will hold.

There are six rules under scrutiny and they actually can be -- they can be categorized in three different ways, into three different pairs. The first set of rules affect local ownership limits. Local ownership limits within a medium.

Specifically there's two of these. First is, how many radio stations you can own in Los Angeles. That is one medium.

Radio. One locality. Los Angeles or New York or Chicago. And there are limits to the number of radio stations that any -- historically been limits that any one entity can own.

Similarly there are limits to the number of television stations within one medium, within one geographic area, that an entity can own.

The second set of rules also deal with local ownership but not within one medium but across media. In fact -- and there are two rules that are relevant in the proceedings. The first is the radio-television cross-ownership limits. It's not within radio, not within television, but how many radio and television combinations can you own in Los Angeles or Nashville or Atlanta or any of the cities in the United States.

The other cross-ownership restriction that's being discussed is a newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership ban that has been in place since the 1970's. A newspaper cannot own its -- newspaper broadcast -- that's broadcasting, including both radio and television -- as a matter of rule cannot own a newspaper -- a newspaper cannot own a radio or television

station in the same city in which it operates.

And lastly, there's two sets of restrictions currently being debated that are really focused not on local markets but on national markets. The first of which is called the national television station ownership rule that limits the ability -- the number of stations that a entity can own nationwide. That's aside from the number you can own in Los Angeles, but can a Los Angeles owner own one in New York, in Chicago, in Seattle and the different cities?

And the last thing is what they call the dual network rule. How many broadcast television networks can one company own? All of these are currently being considered and they're all going to be decided apparently in June.

Taking them one at a time. The first set of rules is the local ownership limits within one medium starting with radio. How many radio stations can one company own in any one city? The original rule prohibited any company or any person from owning more than one radio in the same city. Radio station in the same city. The concern was that if there -- since there were so few stations in any one market, allowing any entity to control more than one them would give them an inordinate amount of control over the points of view expressed in that market.

What has happened since these rules were promulgated back in the 1930's, what happens is we've had a radical expansion in the number of radio stations that are now available compared to

what existed in the 1930's or even what existed in the 1970's.

And in fact, as the number of radio stations expands radically,
the concern that any two of them would be controlled by the
same entity diminishes because the problems go down.

Second, there is a realization that group ownership of radio stations within a market allows the realization of certain efficiencies. Two small-share stations can combine one sales force and make sales calls more effectively. And if they're niche radio stations that are pointed at different markets, they can cross-sell advertising to a single advertiser and it makes it possible. The FCC has recognized through a series of rule-makings that it's made it more possible for them to deliver more programming.

So instead of a blanket ban, they've now adopted what's called -- what I'll call a tiered approach. The tiered approach is really determined by the number of radio stations in a particular market. The different tiers and the amount of the ownership restrictions are determined by the number of stations in the market. Now L.A. will be 45 or more, the next tier down is 30 to 44, 15 to 29 and on farther down. The more stations that are on the market, the more you allow individual stations -- you can allow individual stations to be under the same ownership and not have the kind of public interest and anti-competitive concerns that have animated these rules.

And the rules as they exist today, if you have 45 or more

stations in the market, you get eight. If you have 14 or fewer you get five. You can combine five and on down. There is one thing I'd like to point out about this, is that if you look at the way the tiers are set up, the distinctive aspect about this is it only counts the number of other radio stations in the market. So in measuring what's competition, they're looking solely within one media, radium -- medium radio.

And they don't largely take into account other media.

There's an almost identical set of -- analogous set of restrictions that apply to television. Again, it began originally as a bar on stations owner -- owning more than one television station in the market. That was very appropriate when most parts of the country could not receive more than three or four broadcast signals over the air. As I stated, in the current environment the average U.S. household receives 13 broadcast stations over the air and it's now -- changed the concern that these sorts of combinations would raise.

Again, we've adopted a tiered approach. The tiered approach focuses on the number of independent voices in the market. If there are eight or more, one rule applies. If there are seven or fewer, a different rule applies. Number of voices means station groups. In other words, if two -- if two -- two stations under common ownership, they're one independent voice in the market. And the answer is if there are seven or fewer independent voices in the market,

combinations of television stations are not allowed. If there are eight or more combinations of television stations are allowed, so long as the stations that are combining are not in the top four stations in the market.

Again, the number of voices here is limited to television voices. And looking at the amount of competition that will relieve our concern for this kind of combination, we are only looking at television. This is critically important because this rule was invalidated by the courts in 2002. For precisely its willingness to consider only television voices and is in direct contrast with the next one I'd like to talk about, which is where we start the cross-ownership rules.

So we're moving beyond where we're looking within one medium and we're now looking at the number of stations that can be owned jointly. There's a radio-television cross-ownership rule within the same market that limits the number of combinations of radio and television. Again, the original rule dating back to the 1930's said one to a market. You can have one AM radio station or one FM radio station or one television station, but you could not own both. Both radio and television or both AM and FM. As the market has broadened and the technologies made it possible for us to have more, they've created, again, another tiered approach based on the number of independent voices in the market. Here we have three tiers.

One with 20 or more voices. Ten to 19, or nine or fewer, and

you allow a varying number of increasing level of concentration and co-ownership depending on the number of voices in the market.

Here's the critical difference, though. The voices -- in counting of voices, it's no longer restricted to just radio and television. This particular rule starts to acknowledge that we have new communications media in the world and this rule includes cable and newspapers in the count of the number of voices underlying the competition that relieves the concerns that we have.

The reason this is important is that the difference in approach between this and the television cross-ownership rule is what led the courts to strike down the television local -- the local television ownership rule. They said, why is it that a voice -- newspaper and cable, count as voices for purposes of the radio-television cross-ownership rule, but newspaper and cable does not count as a voice in the local television ownership rule? They say there may be an explanation for that, but you haven't explained why you would draw such a distinction and they vacated the rule as -- I'm sorry -- they remanded the rule as arbitrary and capricious, and it's currently being reconsidered by the FCC.

The other rule that's up is cross-ownership is not radio television, it's newspaper-broadcast. Again it has its origins. The current rule existed -- created in the 1970's

bars any newspaper from owning any broadcast outlet. And in fact what's -- what's notable from the purposes of our standpoint is this is not a tiered approach. It does not matter how many other broadcast outlets or cable outlets or radio outlets would be in the market. The newspaper cross-ownership ban stands as an absolute bar no matter how diverse the underlying media market is. There's another key fact to this, is that in fact 54 broadcast-newspaper combinations do exist. Fifty-four of them were either grandfathered in or granted permanent waivers, and they now exist. And it's one of the interesting things of the ongoing review is, what has been the impact? It's a natural experiment that we can start to understand the role of newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership. This is one of the few rules that made it all the way to the Supreme Court in its current form. It was sustained by the Supreme Court in 1978 against a First Amendment challenge, and it's currently being reconsidered by the FCC, those initiated prior to the current view in 2001. And that's part of an ongoing process that the FCC has taken even outside the biennial process to evaluate its rules. The other two rules are the ones national in focus.

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The other two rules are the ones national in focus.

This -- the national television station ownership rule limits the number of stations you can own nationwide. The concerns are different. This is owning a station in New York and L.A. It will not reduce competition in L.A. You will have the same

number of choices in L.A., the same number of choices in New York. What is really concerned is its impact on the national market for advertising, the national market for program production. And the original rule prohibited ownership of more than three stations nationwide. And this has gone beyond a series of liberalizing moves that became a rule -- started as a rule of three, became a rule of five, rule of seven, rule of twelve, steady broadening because they realize that there are efficiencies if you own a station in Atlanta and L.A. and Chicago; managerial efficiencies, operational efficiencies that can make it very effective. And in fact what happened in the 1996 act, they abolished any absolute limitation on the number of stations you can own. Subject to one very large caveat. The caveat is that the combined reach of any station group cannot exceed 35 percent of the national audience. This is part of the -- this is a major issue because currently, after the Viacom-CBS merger, Viacom is now currently in violation of this at excess of 40 percent, granted waivers by the FCC, and Fox's acquisition of Chris-Craft now exceeds the 30 -- they now exceed the 35 percent cap.

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As part of the biennial review process, the FCC considered whether they should remove this rule in 2000 and they declined to do so. The reason this is very much up for grabs right now is judicial -- the courts have ruled that the FCC's decision not to reconsider the national television station ownership

rule was arbitrary and capricious and they sent it back to the FCC for reconsideration.

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The last of the rules is the dual network rule. The dual network rule originally was drafted because of the NBC blue and red network, which was -- we had two networks in the same control. Started off as a radio rule and they had -- again they had the problems with the blue and red network in television. In the rule -- the solution the FCC had was to prohibit any company or any person from owning more than one television network. In the world of cable and cable networks and where there are 200 -- in excess of 200 cable networks operating and 70 more on the drawing boards at any time, this rule has been under reconsideration for quite some time, and in fact there's -- certain recent merger activity placed particularly strong deregulatory pressure on it. Viacom's acquisition of CBS put it in a position where it had an ownership interest above CBS and UPN. So there was a reconsideration to the rule. The current rule allows ownership of two networks unless both of the networks are in the top four. That is ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox. CBS can own UPN. NBC can own PAX. But the only thing -- the only merger that would be barred under these rules would be a combination of the four leading broadcast networks.

So those are the big -- those are the six rules. A very quick perusal through them to give you a flavor of what's going

on. What are the policy considerations that are going to underlie all of this?

Well, the first I would say is, this is often discussed in terms of very bipolar terms where all the rules were almost identical and it's a choice between regulation and deregulation. I don't think that's true. All these different rules will have different impacts on different segments of the industry and different parts of the inputs that provide the industry. It will affect the guilds differently. It will affect the networks differently. It will affect the cable station -- the cable operators and the television stations very differently. And people who attempt to reduce this debate into a clash between regulation and deregulation I think will misunderstand the issues and misserve the people they're representing because there will be winners and losers of extremely unusual stripes no matter how these rules come out.

The other thing is the -- the other dominant theme that's driving all this is the emergence of new media. Cable and other forms, DBS now control 86 percent of the market. The world in which these rules were written where broadcast networks were three and dominated the television landscape is a very, very different world. And its opened up the policy space in fascinating ways.

The other thing that's interesting is the emergence of new media -- not all media are created equal, and we have a very

complicated set of questions about, do you just count a radio voice the same as you count a television voice? And even among television voices, some are louder than others. Market share matters and simply adding up the voices does not give you a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of exactly how competitive a market is.

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The other thing is the economics of information. There's a growing number of -- of insights provided by this. The basic -- the most fundamental concept is what people call first copy cost. Anyone who creates any information good knows that all the costs are created in the first copy and the subsequent copies are extremely cheap. That's true of movies, it's true of music, it's true of newspaper and local information. what's fascinating is that the economics of information suggest that some amount of media consolidation might be good. There's a story out of Boston that a new -- this Boston newspaper sought a waiver of the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership ban, saying that if you allow us to do that we will get another newspaper into Boston. And if you don't allow us to take the same content we develop for the newspaper and roll it out across both outlets, we won't make enough revenues to survive.

That tells me that the relationship between consolidation and local content and diversity of content and competition can be quite ambiguous. Under certain circumstances, allowing consolidation to occur can in fact enhance the amount of local

content and diversity of information available.

The last is there are significant efficiencies in media consolidation. I'll give you an example out of my own hometown of Nashville. Currently, UPN, WB and Fox jointly market advertising time. Why? Because none of their shares individually is enough to support a solo sales force, and they're all targeting towards different segments of the market. And a sales call can't meet a particular advertiser's needs, and they find that it's much more effective for them to do so. Would that be true in every market? Not necessarily. But it's clear that we've now opened up the way we think about these issues and ways to consider the possibility that consolidation might actually allow new fledgling networks to succeed where they otherwise couldn't.

Two last points. Legal considerations are on the table.

First is what Professor Spitzer -- Dean Spitzer -- mentioned is the importance of empirical evidence. The 1996 acts that requires the FCC to consider whether a rule is no longer necessary is the result of meaningful economic competition, and the courts have interpreted as requiring the FCC to have a solid empirical foundation. A factual foundation for everything it does. This has been a tremendous change. In the past the FCC has been willing to wait and see what happens in the market. It's pretty clear where this new regime as a legal matter, waiting and seeing is no longer an option for the FCC,

at least under the D.C. circuit's interpretation of that.

The other problem is the empirical studies are quite mixed on the affect of consolidation, and I think the fairest read as a person who is not -- doesn't have any particular dog in this fight is that if anything, it suggests that consolidation is neutral with regard to diversity, localism and competition.

And in fact a large number of the studies suggest that allowing more consolidation to occur would produce more diverse and more local content on the airwaves and in the general media. That is a controversial proposition. There are 12 studies by the FCC. Some were criticized by their -- the people who want to keep the regime going, but there's a very vibrant literature that's largely getting -- not getting the attention it belongs -- deserves.

And the last thing from a legal standpoint is what led to the strike down of the one rules is that you'll discover that the tiers and the willingness to consider alternative voices are generally contradictory, and there is not really a unified approach taken by the FCC. In fact, that's anathema to a legal scholar. Being consistent across the board is one of the obligations administrative agencies have, and it's one of the problems that the FCC is confronting about how to unify all this around a consistent perspective.

The last comment I will make is that this is only the big major round in what's going to certainly be an enduring fight.

There are a number of other issues waiting in the wings. The national cable ownership rules and the channel capacity rules recently struck down by the courts are up for reconsideration as well. There is a cable DBS cross-ownership proposal up, digital television, whether they have to be carried on cable and what public interest obligations they'll bear. The deployment of third generation wireless devices waits in the offing. There have been a number of proposals to revive a rule called FINSYN, the financial and syndication rules, which will be of tremendous interest to the next panel. And whatever the resolution happens on June 2nd, this will only be another round, although a major round in what is almost certain to be a very long and protracted debate about the media ownership rules that will govern the media in the future. Thank you.

MS. ORTIZ: Thank you, Professor Woo. I want to point out something I'm sure you're all aware of, which is we are running very late. That's the problem -- the challenge we faced in paring down a full-day event to a half-day event is that we had such incredible speakers and we want to give them the time to make their statements.

We're now going to start the first panel. We are going to allow the panelists to have their time because that's why we are all here and that's why they've made the time to be here and try to make up some of the time during the breaks. And frankly, the event will probably go just a little bit late

because I don't want to cut short the public comment period either. Our real deadline at the end of the day is making sure that Commissioner Copps gets out of here in time to catch his flight and we, I think, have a little -- I may feel more comfortable with the leeway we have than he feels comfortable, but we'll see how that goes.

I would like to now introduce Tracy Westen, who will be moderating both of the panels today. Tracy is an adjunct professor of media law at the USC Annenberg School for Communication. He is also a former deputy director of the Federal Trade Communications Bureau of Consumer Protection and founder and director of the Los Angeles-based Center for Governmental Studies, which promotes a more open, responsive government. Tracy also spent two years as a legal advisor at the FCC not so long ago. Tracy.

MR. WESTEN: Thank you, Sandra. This first panel is

Economics and Diversity in Programming, and it raises the

question, why focus on entertainment? Why is entertainment

important and relevant to an FCC proceeding on ownership of the

media?

Well, as Justice Harlan once said, "One man's entertainment teaches another doctrine." The line between entertainment and news is, for better or worse, increasingly illusory. Entertainment informs. News entertains. Both are essential to a functioning democracy. The core question here,

I think, is what rules allowing concentration of ownership and control over the media will unleash the greatest burst of creativity, diversity and competition that our nation wants, needs and deserves? Do new channels, new media outlets and globalization require media conglomeration or media organizations to bulk up, so to speak, to increase their ability to present high quality entertainment? Or will greater concentration squeeze out diversity and creativity and innovation in programming?

It seems that the FCC addresses these major controversial issues almost every 30 years. In the 1940's, the FCC addressed network ownership and the contractual relationships between the networks and their affiliates, adopting rules, some of which are still with us today. In the 1970's, the FCC adopted the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules and the Prime Time Access Rules, some of which were repealed in the 1990's. And 30 years after that, in the 2000's, the FCC is again addressing these very important questions in an environment of more channels, increased technology, different regulatory approaches and different approaches to the First Amendment.

We have with us today an extraordinary panel. Their bios are listed in your packets, so I will not spend time repeating them all because time is short. If you've checked your watches, this panel is already halfway over. So we will extend the time and try and give each speaker about ten minutes. I

will remind them at about the eight- or nine-minute mark that the time is coming to a close. We will proceed in the order from your left all the way over to the right. We also, I believe, have a speaker, Martin Franks, by video conference, who will speak at the end of this presentation.

So let's start with Mark Pedowitz, on your far left,

Executive Vice President of ABC Entertainment Television Group,

oversees ABC Late Night and ABC Kids' Programming.

MR. PEDOWITZ: Thank you, Tracy. My name is Mark Pedowitz, and I am Executive Vice President of the ABC Entertainment
Television Group. My responsibilities include negotiating the business arrangements for the right to exhibit entertainment programming on the ABC Television Network and overseeing production of business for Touchstone Television. I have extensive experience in the business relationship between program producers and networks. Prior to joining ABC in 1991, I helped (inaudible) for a legal position in an MGM/MCA (inaudible) entertainment and (inaudible) company. To put it simply, I have been on every side of the table regarding the licensing and programming for television networks. With me today is (inaudible), President of the ABC Television Network, who will be available to answer any questions you may have.

My comments today will focus on recent efforts to re-regulate programming aspects of network television. Based on my experience, there is absolutely no factual or legal basis

for the government to wade into the marketplace with network television programming. Today's television business bears no resemblance to the free network world and (inaudible) the basis for government regulation of network programming practices.

Despite the fact that there will always be complaints about TV programming, and despite a hazy and forgetful nostalgia for what some call the Golden Age of Television, the indisputable fact is that the American consumer today enjoys a greater quantity, quality and variety of television programming than at any time in our nation's history.

In the early 1970's, the television industry consisted of almost entirely of three broadcast networks. For example, in 1975, the three-network share of prime time programming was 93 percent. Seeking greater diversity and choice for consumers, for advertisers and for program producers, the government set out on a two-pronged effort, to create greater competition. First, the government imposed FCC rules and judicial consent decrees to regulate the business relationship between network and program producers. These became the financial interest and syndication provisions, and they were premised on the concern that program producers had only three places to try to license their shows. The second part of the government program was an effort to stimulate more competition and more options for the television viewer.

By the early 1990's, the effort to create more channels of

television choice succeeded. The factual and legal basis for the financial interest and syndication restrictions were now antiquated in the marketplace. Viewers could choose programs from four broadcast networks and more than 100 new cable networks. Similarly, program producers could offer their programs to far more outlets than had existed in the early 1970's. Although disputes continued between networks and program producers, the access bottleneck of the original three networks had been broken. Despite the elimination of the three network (inaudible) by the early 1990's, production entities have benefited from the financial interest and syndication rules fought long and hard to retain those restrictions; however, following a strong review by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, (inaudible) Communication versus the FCC, the FCC chose to repeal its rules and then (inaudible) the Department of Justice successfully asked the courts to vacate (inaudible) consent decree.

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Given the many networks to which program producers could seek to license their programs, there was no longer any factual or legal basis for continued government intervention into the business relationship between network and program producers. In striking down the rule, the Seventh Circuit stated very plainly that the FCC could not ignore the fact that the networks as of 1992 had lost market power. The court that dissolved the consent decree found that when all is said and

done about the changes in the television industry since 1980, it could hardly be said that 34 percent, for an average slightly more than 11 percent, the reach of NBC, ABC or CBS amounts to a marketplace power, the basis of the consent judgments. The Seventh Circuit went so far as to express new skepticism about whether the rules ever made any sense. They found, as a result of the rules, television production became a riskier business and the production of prime time programming became more concentrated. The court added the basis for the rules was never very clear, and they have done nothing other than insulate independent producers from competition from new producers and from the networks.

It is remarkable that ten years after (inaudible) factual basis for these ill-conceived rules (inaudible). There are those who suggest that it should be brought back to life.

Whatever self-interest might motivate their clinical agenda, the law in this area is clear. The rules cannot be re-imposed unless market conditions needed to justify them can be shown to exist today, and it is indisputably evident that they do not. The courts found, in 1992 and 1993, the rules could not be justified on the strength of network power that then existed. As I describe in a moment, it is indisputable that the networks' market power has only continued to erode since the early 1990's. (Inaudible.) Michelle, thank you.

Here is a chart that shows the universe of broadcast

television networks in 1970, 30. And here is a chart that lists over 300 networks and cable programming services in existence today. Since the repeal of the financial interest and syndication rules in 1993, the television marketplace has become even more competitive and diverse. Today, if you include Fox Broadcasting, the total four networks' share of prime time viewing is now under 45 percent. If a producer or production company is unable to develop or license a program with ABC, they can take their program to a broadcast network competitor, NBC, CBS, UPN, WB, FOX, PBS or PAX. Or they can take their program to one of the more of hundreds of cable networks such as USA, SCI-FI Channel, Lifetime, HBO, TNT, Showtime, A&E, FX, Hallmark, Bravo, or even to a first-run television syndicator such as Universal, King World, Tribune, Sony, Warner Brothers. The proponents of regulation cannot credibly argue that these new networks or outlets are weaker alternatives to the original three broadcast networks. Indeed, the contrary is true. Here is a chart that tracks the audience growth of new cable networks as compared to the audience decline of the four strongest broadcast networks. As you can see, the lines actually cross in 2001, with the result that the new cable networks now command a larger share of the viewing than do the four largest broadcast networks. While it is true that on most nights, each of the four largest broadcast networks have larger audiences than any one individual cable

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